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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
INCOME TAX-BASIS OF Loss IN CASE OF ANTICIPATED DAM-
AGES.-The Ewing-Thomas Converting Company contracted to de-
liver a specified quantity of yarn during the year 1919, to one Myers.
At the close of the year prices were steadily advancing and Myers was
demanding delivery in accordance with the contract. Delivery was
finally made in May, 1920. The taxpayer then deducted as a loss
sustained in 1919, a sum equal to the loss which it estimated would be
sustained in the performance of such similar contracts. The Collector
of Internal Revenue under section 214 (a) of the Revenue Act of
1918 contended that the loss was not such as might be deducted in
1919. The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
sustained the collector. The appellant petitioned for a review. Held,
to justify deduction in 1919 of anticipated damages because of a
breach, the contract must be performed within a short time after the
close of the year, the amount of damages must be reasonably predict-
able, negotiations for settlement must be commenced within the
year and completed soon after its close. Here liability could not be
reasonably determined on December 31, 1919, and so no deduction
was allowed. Ewing-Thomas Converting Co. v. McCaughn (C. C. A.,
3rd, Sept. 11, 1930).
The deduction for loss of a taxpayer's breach of contract is not
allowed ' except under special circumstances. 2 Since it could not be
said that the loss was in 1919 and since the taxpayer did not
in that year accrue an estimated amount of the loss on its books
rejection of the deduction for the year should be sustained. Article
144 of the statute does not contemplate the deduction of losses
resulting in the mere fluctuation of the value of property.4 A
liability incurred through'a breach of contract is a deductible loss for
the year in which the breach occurred, where liability was admitted,
an offer in compromise made, and an amount representing the esti-
mated liability was accrued on the books.a Though the amount of the
loss was undetermined until the compromised settlement was affected
during the succeeding year.6 But not as to a deduction prior to the
year in which the settlement was agreed to, and the liability was
entered upon the books.7 However, loss from mere cancellation of
contract is not allowed.! Since the Income Tax Law is concerned
only with realized losses as well as with realized gains, 9 the decision
disallowing the deduction in the instant case was in line with the rule
'Appeal of Brighton Mills, 1 B. T. A. 392 (1925).
2 Nice BalIbearing Company, 5 B. T. A. 484 (1926).
'Sec. 234 (a), Rev. Act of 1918; Lucas American Code Co., Inc., 280
U. S. 445 (C. C. A., 2nd, 1930).
'Art. 144, Rev. Act of 1918, New York Ins. Co. v. Edwards, 271 U. S. 109
(C. C. A., 2nd, 1926).
'Nelk Process Cork, 3 B. T. A. 1339 (1926).
"Raleigh Smokeless Fuel, 6 B. T. A. 381 (1927).
'Lynchburg Colliery Co., Inc., 7 B. T. A. (1927).
'Ledbetter Mfg. Co., 12 B. T. A. 145 (1928).
'Weiss v. Weinert, 279 U. S. 333, 49 Sup. Ct. 337 (1929) ; Klein, Federal
Income Taxation (1929), par. 6:31 (a), 21:48 (d).
TAX COMMENT
as laid by the court in past decisions.' ° Although it has been held
that the taxpayer's liability for damages on account of a breach of
contract in 1920, was a loss sustained and deductible in that year,
and though the amount of damages was negotiated, agreed upon and
paid the following year," this decision has been limited to cases in
which the taxpayer admits liability by offer of settlement immedi-
ately after the breach.' 2
R. D. F.
INCOME TAX-TRUST SITUS-INTANGIBLES-DOUBLE TAXA-
TION.-These are three cases, decided together, involving three com-
plaints for the abatement of certain income taxes assessed by the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts I and paid by the complainants,
residents of Massachusetts, as trustees under three wills, two being
administered in New York and one in the District of Columbia. The
trust property, consisting of intangibles, had previously been taxed by
New York and the District of Columbia respectively. Plaintiffs allege
that, the trustees having been appointed by the courts of New York
and the District of Columbia, and the trusts being administered in
those jurisdictions, these trusts are liable to the state of New York
and the District of Columbia for an income tax on the gains and
profits here sought to be taxed. Held, that the fact that trustees were
residents of Massachusetts did not authorize that State to impose
income taxes on the trust, since, the property having already been
taxed in New York and the District of Columbia respectively, such
action would render them liable to double taxation. Edward W.
Hutchins et al., Trustees v. Commissioner of Corporations and Tax-
ation, Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (U. S. Daily 2361,
Oct. 2, 1930).
The Court states that the taxing section indicates an intention on
the part of the General Court to tax all the income there described
which is within its power to tax. "It is as broad as the jurisdiction
of the Commonwealth." The question of jurisdiction is disposed of
not as an original problem, but on the theory enunciated in Farmers'
Loan and Trust Company v. Minnesota,' that the courts of New
York and the District of Columbia have already settled the situs of
the trusts, and that such situs for the purpose of taxation having been
established in New York and the District of Columbia, the Common-
wealth is powerless, under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
"Empire Printing & Box Company, 5 B. T. A. 303 (1926) ; Hidalgo Steel
Company, 8 B. T. A. 76 (1927).
Producers Fuel, 1 B. T. A. 202 (1925).
'Hamnler Coal Company, 4 B. T. A. 947 (1926).
'Under Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 62, sec. 10.
2280 U. S. 204, 50 Sup. Ct. 98 (1930).
